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THE INCONSISTENT INHERITANCE RIGHTS OF 
ADULT ADOPTEES AND A PROPOSAL FOR 
UNIFORMITY 
As summarized by the comparison of laws in Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Indiana, and Minnesota, the inheritance rights of adult adoptees vary 
across jurisdictions.  The inheritance rights of an adult adoptee will 
depend on the status of the stranger-to-the-adoption rule in the 
jurisdiction, the age limitations for inheritance in the jurisdiction, and 
whether there is any language granting or restricting inheritance rights in 
the testamentary documents.  The majority of the time, the goal of the 
adoption is to make the person a genuine member of the family.  As it 
stands, states do not uniformly treat adult adoptees as genuine members 
of the family.  A default rule that uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s 
inheritance rights is generally in line with the adoptor’s motivation for the 
adoption.  Three proposals may help to remedy the inconsistent adoption 
rights across jurisdictions: First, “family” should be defined by looking at 
the functional role each member plays, as opposed to using marital status 
to define “family” and to determine the benefits that accompany that 
status through marriage.  Second, allowing a person to designate his or 
her heir is a partial solution for partners that are prevented from adopting 
or for partners who are discouraged from adopting by the awkward 
parent–child relationship that would result from the adoption.  Third, a 
uniform law that gives an adult adoptee the status of a natural child of the 
adoptor, without any age limits, would ensure the equal treatment of adult 
adoptees across the country. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the areas of trust and will interpretation, states vary on how to 
interpret class gifts that include language such as “issue,” “heirs,” and 
“children.”  This variance is one motivation for people to undertake 
drastic measures such as adult adoption.  For example, Father and 
Mother set up a trust to benefit their children, X, Y, & Z.  Z dislikes his 
siblings but has no spouse or children.  Z wants to make sure his share of 
his parents’ trust does not go to his siblings.  Z adopts a good friend of 
his, T, who is an adult.  Jurisdictions vary on how to interpret T’s 
interest and vary on T’s ability to benefit from Z’s parents’ trust.  Some 
statutes only restrict an adult adoptee’s ability to inherit from a third 
party when the testamentary documents specifically prohibit such 
inheritance.  Other statutes set a strict age limit, disallowing an adult 
adoptee to inherit from a third party when they are adopted after age 
eighteen.  Although the example illustrates one motivation for adult 
adoption, most times an adoption is a result of a close and loving 
relationship.  The goal of the adoption is to make the person a genuine 
member of the family.  As it stands, states do not uniformly treat adult 
adoptees as genuine members of the family.  A default rule that 
uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s inheritance rights generally aligns 
with the adoptor’s motivation for the adoption. 
There are several different theories on how to remedy this 
inconsistency.  One solution would change the current definition and 
meaning of “family” in the law.  The so-called “functional” approach 
attempts to define the familial relationship by actually looking at the 
nature of the relationship between parties.  Another solution would 
allow people to designate a beneficiary at law, eliminating the need to 
turn to drastic measures, such as adult adoption.  A third solution would 
be to pass a uniform law giving an adult adoptee the status of a natural 
child.  Uniformity would help to fulfill the goal of undertaking the 
adoption in the first place—to take in the person as a genuine member 
of the family. 
In this Comment, Part II will discuss the history of adoption and give 
a background on how adult adoption differs from “regular” adoption.  
Part III will discuss the different motivations parties would have for 
adult adoption, ranging from inclusion in a class gift to denying standing 
to collateral relatives who seek to challenge a testamentary disposition.  
Part IV compares the current inheritance rights of adult adoptees in 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and Minnesota.  Part V outlines solutions 
and proposals for solving the inconsistency of adult adoptees’ 
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inheritance rights across jurisdictions.  Finally, Part VI concludes with a 
summary of the main issues and the proposals to remedy those issues. 
II.  HISTORY OF ADOPTION 
The progression of the laws of succession and adoption is important 
to understanding the slow changes and unsure outcomes in inheritance 
law as applied to adoptees today.  Adoption was not recognized at 
common law; the process of formal adoption is a product of statutory 
law.1  At common law, succession was based on blood relationships.2  As 
a result of this preference for blood relationships, historically there was 
strong resistance to the idea that anyone outside a direct blood 
relationship would inherit family property.3  This resistance started to 
change in the mid-nineteenth century when the first adoption statutes 
helped to legitimize the idea of adoption, allowing families to codify 
“parent–child” relationships.4  The first statutes, however, disfavored 
adoptees and barred them from inheriting from third-party donors 
under the “stranger-to-the-adoption rule.”5  In contrast, statutes today 
treat adopted children as “full-fledged” members of the adoptive 
family.6  Today, adoption statutes seek to promote the best interests of 
the child, a goal accomplished by totally transplanting the child into the 
new family with a “fresh start.”7 
Even though modern adoption statutes attempt to transplant a 
minor adoptee into the new family, many statutes leave unanswered 
 
1. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get 
What and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on 
Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 713 (1984).  Rein’s 1984 article 
has been highly influential and frequently cited within the field.  See E. Gary Spitko, Open 
Adoption, Inheritance, and the “Uncleing” Principle, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765, 780 n.54 
(2008) (stating that Rein’s was an “important article on inheritance rights arising from 
adoption”).  As of February 13, 2012, Westlaw had 108 references that cite to Rein’s article, 
including sixteen cases. 
2. Rein, supra note 1, at 713. 
3. Id. 
4. Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH 
L. REV. 93, 148 (1996); Rein, supra note 1, at 714–15 (explaining that the first adoption 
statutes were part of a large “wave of social welfare reform”). 
5. Spitko, supra note 1, at 771 (quoting Naomi Cahn, Perfect Substitutes or the Real 
Thing?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1128 (2003)).  The stranger-to-the-adoption rule creates a 
presumption that an adoptee is not within a class gift when the donor is not also the adoptor.  
Rein, supra note 1, at 733. 
6. Spitko, supra note 1, at 772. 
7. Kelly v. Iverson (In re Estates of Donnelly), 502 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Wash. 1972); 
Rein, supra note 1, at 713, 719. 
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questions regarding succession rights of the adoptee, the adopting 
family, and the adoptee’s genetic family.8  Professor Jan Rein 
enumerates topics that an ideal statute would cover concerning 
succession rights in an adoption: 
 
(1) Can the adoptee and the adoptor inherit from each other?  
(2) Can the adoptee inherit through the adoptor from the 
adoptor’s kindred?  (3) Can the adoptor’s kindred inherit from 
and through the adoptee?  (4) Should the adoptee’s former 
ability to inherit from his biological parents and their kindred be 
retained or abolished?  (5) Should the former ability of the 
biological parents and their kindred to inherit from the adoptee 
be retained or abolished?  (6) Should any of these questions be 
answered differently in relative adoption cases when the adoptor 
is either a stepparent or a blood relative of the adoptee? . . .  
(8) Should these questions be answered differently with respect 
to inheritance by, from, and through a person who is adopted as 
an adult?9 
 
Even if the relevant statute adequately covers an adoptee’s inheritance 
rights, a donative document may alter the rights of adoptees. 
To determine if an adoptee inherits under a donative document, the 
adoption statute may become relevant to aid in the court’s 
interpretation.10  To interpret a donative document, the court first looks 
at the donor’s intent, which is the “controlling consideration in 
determining the meaning of the donative document.”11  If there are 
ambiguities or gaps, the court looks at the statute: 
 
[T]he court must find the donor’s intent somehow and does so 
by indulging in a presumption as to what the average donor 
using the language he used must have intended.  Here is where 
the adoption statutes and the statutes of descent and distribution 
 
8. Rein, supra note 1, at 712. 
9. Id. at 718. 
10. See McKee v. McDonald (In re Estate of McDonald), 20 Wis. 2d 63, 67, 121 N.W.2d 
245, 248 (1963) (“Existing statutory and case law is one of the extrinsic aids which may be 
consulted in resolving a will ambiguity by construction.  The reason for this is that testator is 
presumed to know the law—both statutory and case law.  Where applicable law is to be 
looked to as a surrounding circumstance, it is the law in effect at the time of making the will.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 (2003). 
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come in by the back door.  Most courts now view these statutes 
as reflective of community attitudes toward adoptees and thus, 
by inference, reflective of the attitude of the particular donor as 
a member of the community.12 
 
This process of interpreting a donative document and using the 
statutes to fill gaps is apparent in the interpretation of class gifts.13  An 
example of a class gift would be a disposition in a will giving money or 
property “to my nieces and nephews to share equally.”14  A donor may 
never consider whether a class gift should include an adoptee, creating 
the possibility that the court will use the statute as a gap-filler.15 
When a court must decide the inheritance rights of adoptees, several 
factors come into play, including the donor–donee relationship and the 
laws in force at the time the donative document was executed.16  First, 
courts distinguish between instruments executed by the adoptor and 
instruments executed by someone other than the adoptor.17  When the 
adoptor is the donor, a class gift will include the adoptee.18  This concept 
is consistent with the goal of adoption statutes—a total transplantation 
of the adoptee into the adoptor’s family.19  However, when the donor is 
someone other than the adoptor, for instance where a grandparent gives 
a gift “to my grandchildren” and there is a grandchild adopted as an 
adult, courts have had a harder time deciding whether adoptees are 
included in a class gift.20 
In addition to the relationship between parties, courts may also 
consider the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine, which creates a 
 
12. Rein, supra note 1, at 732; see also In re Estate of McDonald, 20 Wis. 2d at 67, 121 
N.W.2d at 248 (explaining that the court may consult the statutes as an extrinsic aid in 
resolving a will ambiguity). 
13. ”A class gift is a disposition to beneficiaries who are described by a group label and 
are intended to take as a group.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 13.1(a) (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004). 
14. See, e.g., Stratton v. Rollings (In re Estate of Phillips), 236 Wis. 268, 272, 294 N.W. 
824, 825 (1940) (devising “to my nieces and nephews . . . the sum of $8,000 to be divided 
between them share and share alike and to their heirs and assigns forever”). 
15. Rein, supra note 1, at 732. 
16. Id. at 733, 737. 
17. Id. at 733. 
18. Id. 
19. See id. at 719; Spitko, supra note 1, at 772. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 21–28 (explaining that whether the adoptee is 
entitled to inherit from a third party depends on whether the jurisdiction has repealed the 
stranger-to-the-adoption rule and whether the new rule is applied retroactively). 
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presumption that an adoptee is not within a class gift when the donor is 
not also the adoptor.21  To rebut the presumption, the party seeking to 
include the adoptee within a class gift must prove that the donor was 
aware of the adoptee at the time of the instrument’s execution.22  
Recently however, courts have overwhelmingly overturned the stranger-
to-the-adoption presumption, giving way to a more inclusive policy 
toward adoptees.23  In a case on point, the Supreme Court of New Jersey 
stated that “[w]e cannot believe it probable that strangers to the 
adoption would differentiate between the natural child and the adopted 
child of another. . . .  We ought not impute to others instincts contrary to 
our own.”24  Courts no longer automatically exclude adoptees from a 
class gift executed by a third party; however, there can be restrictions 
upon the gift.25  For example, the Uniform Probate Code (UPC) suggests 
that if the transferor is not the adoptive parent, an adoptee will not take 
in a class gift unless: “(1) the adoption took place before the adoptee 
reached [18] years of age; (2) the adoptive parent was the adoptee’s 
stepparent or foster parent; or (3) the adoptive parent functioned as a 
parent of the adoptee before the adoptee reached [18] years of age.”26 
 
21. Rein, supra note 1, at 733; see also Warren v. Prescott, 24 A. 946, 949 (Me. 1892) 
(stating that “[b]y adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot 
thus make one for their kindred”); Knoeller v. Uihlein (In re Estate of Uihlein), 269 Wis. 170, 
176, 68 N.W.2d 816, 820 (1955) (“The status resulting from adoption proceedings is not a 
natural one.  It is a civil or contractual status.  One may have the right to assume the status of 
a father to a stranger of the blood, but he has no moral right to impose upon his brother the 
status of an uncle to his adopted son.” (quoting Bradley v. Tweedy (In re Estate of Bradley), 
185 Wis. 393, 396–97, 201 N.W. 973, 974 (1925))). 
22. Rein, supra note 1, at 733–34. 
23. Id. at 735. 
24. In re Estate of Coe, 201 A.2d 571, 575 (N.J. 1964); see also Smith v. Reinhart (In re 
Will of Adler), 30 Wis. 2d 250, 262, 140 N.W.2d 219, 225 (1966) (“This theory [of the 
importance of blood relationships] is completely contrary to the present attitude of the family 
and of the public toward adoption.  The tendency, desire, and public policy in every adoption 
is to completely absorb an adopted child into a family unit and to make his status in fact 
indistinguishable from that of a natural child, not only in his relationship with his adoptive 
parents, but, also, with the general public and with relatives who are not immediate members 
of the family circle.”). 
25. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705 (2004) (amended 2008). 
26. Id. § 2-705(f).  The brackets around the eighteen signify that the developers of the 
UPC do not believe there will be uniformity on the specific age.  Thus, states may allow 
adoptees to take under the will if they were raised in the adoptor’s house from an earlier age.  
For example, in Wisconsin, the adoptee can take as a member of a class if the “[t]he adoptive 
parent raised the adopted person in a parent-like relationship beginning on or before the 
child’s 15th birthday and lasting for a substantial period or until adulthood.”  WIS. STAT. 
§ 854.20 (2009–2010). 
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In addition to the stranger-to-the-adoption rule, courts may take into 
consideration the adoption laws that were in force at the time the 
document was executed.27  This factor becomes especially significant 
when the court’s interpretation of the instrument occurs many years 
after its execution.28  For instance, imagine a situation where the 
instrument was created when the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine was 
in full force, but the interpretation happens today, when the doctrine 
has been mostly overturned.29  Courts have been inconsistent on 
whether to apply the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine retroactively.30  
For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that 
“[w]e generally apply the law at the time of death, with the 
understanding that testators have kept abreast of the changes in the law 
and would make appropriate revisions in their instruments if these 
changes contravened their original expectations.”31  In contrast, Indiana 
abrogated the stranger-to-the-adoption rule in 2003 and included a 
provision that allows courts to apply the new rule retroactively, meaning 
that adoptees would inherit  from a third party even if the testamentary 
document was executed while the stranger-to-the-adoption rule was 
effective.32  In Paloutzian v. Taggart, the Indiana Court of Appeals 
applied the new statute to create a rebuttable presumption that the 
donor intended to include her adopted grandchild when the trust stated 
it would benefit the “children” of her son if he did not survive the 
donor.33 
Faced with similar circumstances, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to retroactively apply the 
statute that overturned the stranger-to-the-adoption doctrine.34  One 
reason that courts refuse to apply the new presumption to previously 
executed instruments is because of the “assumption that the average 
American citizen of fifty or eighty years ago would not have wished non-
blood related adoptive family members to partake of his bounty.”35  
 
27. Rein, supra note 1, at 737.  Rein terms this factor “the retroactivity problem.”  Id.  
28. See, e.g., Paloutzian v. Taggart, 931 N.E.2d 921, 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) 
(interpreting a document in 2010 that was executed in 1953). 
29. See, e.g., id. at 923–24. 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 31–32 (noting that two jurisdictions are different 
on whether to retroactively apply an inclusive presumption toward adoptees).   
31. Callan v. Winters, 534 N.E.2d 298, 301 (Mass. 1989). 
32. IND. CODE ANN. § 30-4-1-4 (LexisNexis 2011). 
33. 931 N.E.2d at 929. 
34. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash., D.C. v. Summerlin, 445 F.2d 201, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
35. Rein, supra note 1, at 738. 
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However, authorities have questioned the validity of this assumption.36  
For example, the court in Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Hanes 
discussed the retroactive inclusion of an adoptee in a class gift: 
 
While there may be testators and trustors who are so concerned 
with medieval concepts of “bloodline” and “heirs of the body” 
that they would truly be upset at the thought that their hard-won 
assets would one day pass into the hands of persons not of their 
blood, we cannot formulate general rules of law for the benefit 
of eccentrics.37 
 
Thus, whether an adoptee will be included in the class gift from a 
third-party donor depends on (1) the existence of a statute or case 
overturning the stranger-to-adoption statute and (2) the retroactive 
application of the statute or rule.38  
In addition to adoption generally, adult adoption adds another level 
into the analysis.  The vast majority of states allow some form of adult 
adoption; only six states prohibit or restrict an adult from adopting 
another.39  Several of these states are discussed below. 
III.  WHY WOULD AN ADULT ADOPT ANOTHER ADULT? 
In this Part, I will discuss the common and less prevalent reasons 
why an adult would adopt another adult, the subsidiary issue of partner 
adoption, and the consequences of adoption. 
A.  Common Reasons 
Rein writes that “[t]he motives revealed in adult adoption cases are 
a testament to the fertility of human imagination.”40  However, there are 
a few common motivations for adopting another adult.  First, a step-
parent or foster parent may want to adopt an adult with whom they 
 
36. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co. v. Hanes, 237 S.E.2d 499, 503 (W. Va. 1977); Rein, 
supra note 1, at 739 (stating that the average testator does not, in fact, prefer blood relatives 
over adopted relatives to inherit his or her property). 
37. 237 S.E.2d at 503. 
38. See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text. 
39. Terry L. Turnipseed, Scalia’s Ship of Revulsion Has Sailed: Will Lawrence Protect 
Adults Who Adopt Lovers to Help Ensure Their Inheritance from Incest Prosecution?, 32 
HAMLINE L. REV. 95, 107–08 (2009). 
40. Rein, supra note 1, at 750. 
18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  9:58 PM 
1052 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1043 
have established a parent–child relationship.41  Second, the goal of the 
adoption could be to gain some sort of benefit for the adoptee, such as 
bringing the adoptee within a class gift or guaranteeing the adoptee an 
intestate share.42  The benefit could include the adoptee’s right to inherit 
directly from the adoptor or from a third party “through” the adoptor.43  
Third, the adoption might have been an attempt to keep collateral 
relatives, especially disinherited heirs, from having standing to challenge 
a disposition of property.44 
A common motivation that an adult has for adopting another adult 
is to codify an existing parent–child relationship.45  “One of the strongest 
motives for adult adoption is that it allows individuals to formally and 
legally express their commitment to one another by creating a family 
unit.”46  For example, a step-parent or foster parent may adopt someone 
that he or she has raised as his or her own child.47  For the purposes of 
inheritance, the UPC looks to whether there was a parent–child 
relationship between the parties.48  To be a parent, the parent must 
“behav[e] toward a child in a manner consistent with being the child’s 
parent and perform[] functions that are customarily performed by a 
parent.”49  If there is such a relationship, “the parent is a parent of the 
child and the child is a child of the parent for the purpose of intestate 
succession.”50 
 
41. Statutes that do restrict adult adoption often make an exception for a step-parent.  
For example, Alabama law permits adult adoptions when an adult “consents in writing to be 
adopted and is related in any degree of kinship . . . or is a stepchild by marriage.”  ALA. CODE 
§ 26-10A-6 (LexisNexis 2009). 
42. See In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del. 1993) (“Many 
jurisdictions limit inquiry into the motives or purposes of an adult adoption.  However, most 
recognize that adult adoptions for the purpose of creating inheritance rights are valid.”). 
43. See Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 97. 
44. Id.; DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 102 (8th ed. 2009) (noting 
that “[t]he only persons who have standing to challenge the validity of a will are those who 
would take if the will were denied probate”). 
45. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
46. Gwendolyn L. Snodgrass, Creating Family Without Marriage: The Advantages and 
Disadvantages of Adult Adoption Among Gay and Lesbian Partners, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 
75, 80–81 (1997–1998). 
47. See, e.g., Hays v. Hays, 946 So. 2d 867, 870 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006) (disallowing an 
attempt by a step-mother to adopt her step-daughter after her husband’s death because the 
relationship did not qualify for the statutory adoption through marriage). 
48. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-115(4) (2004) (amended 2008). 
49. Id. 
50. Id. § 2-116. 
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A second motivation is to bring the adoptee within a class gift or to 
codify the relationship such that the adoptee will share the adoptor’s 
estate if he or she were to die intestate.51  Courts have come to different 
results on this issue, especially when the donor of the gift is not the 
adoptor.52  Some courts allow an adult adoptee to inherit, for example, 
from the parents of the adoptor who give a gift to their grandchildren, 
while other courts would disallow this gift.53  For example, in the case In 
re Adoption of Berston, a twenty-nine-year-old petitioned to adopt his 
mother to bring her within the provisions of a trust created by his 
father.54  The court allowed the adoption, stating that the statute 
“unequivocally authorizes a petition for the adoption of ‘an adult’ by 
‘any person’ as to foreclose any limiting construction.”55  
Another main motivation to adopt an adult is to deny standing to 
potential contestants to a will.  “The only persons who have standing to 
challenge the validity of a will are those who would take if the will were 
denied probate.  To gain standing to challenge the will, the decedent’s 
collateral relatives must first overturn the adoption.”56  For example, in 
Collamore v. Learned, a seventy-year-old man adopted three adults for 
the purpose of denying his relatives standing to oppose his will.57  Justice 
Holmes, before he was appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, wrote that 
adopting another adult for the purpose of denying standing to relatives 
was “perfectly proper.”58  Another example is In re Adoption of 
Swanson, where the adoptor sought “to prevent collateral claims . . . 
from remote family members.”59  The Delaware Supreme Court stated 
that beyond the “common sense limitations,” the motive behind an 
 
51. Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families, 18 LAW & INEQ. 1, 38 
(2000). 
52. Jerry Simon Chasen, Planning for Non-Traditional Families, in ADVANCED ESTATE 
PLANNING TECHNIQUES 345, 352 (ALI-ABA, Course of Study, 2006) (noting that some 
states have given adult adoptees less rights to inheritance than minor adoptees); Turnipseed, 
supra note 39, at 104–05.  “Even when statutory language indicates that adopted adults may 
qualify as members of a class, courts will not necessarily interpret or apply the law in that 
manner when construing wills and trust instruments.”  Chasen, supra, at 352. 
53. See Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 104–05. 
54. Berston v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re Adoption of Berston), 206 N.W.2d 28, 
29 (Minn. 1973). 
55. Id. at 30 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 259.22 (1971)). 
56. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 102. 
57. 50 N.E. 518, 518–19 (Mass. 1898). 
58. Id. at 519. 
59. 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993). 
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adult adoption is generally not relevant.60  To that end, the court allowed 
the adoption, denying the adoptor’s relatives standing to challenge his 
will.61 
B.  Less Prevalent Reasons 
In addition to the main motivations for adopting an adult, there are 
several collateral reasons to adopt another adult, including to obtain tax 
benefits and to circumvent strict housing codes.62  One such reason is to 
obtain favorable tax treatment.63  Through the adoption, the adoptor 
may be able to receive the “head of household” status for taxes and may 
be entitled to a dependency deduction.64  Additionally, the adoptor 
might seek to adopt another adult to avoid an inheritance tax.65  In re 
Adoption of Swanson is an example of a case where an adoptor who 
sought to avoid an inheritance tax.66  The adoptor sought “to obtain the 
reduced inheritance tax rate which natural and adopted children enjoy 
under Delaware law.”67  The Delaware Supreme Court allowed the 
adoption.68  In addition to beneficial tax rates, a person may seek to 
adopt another adult to circumvent housing codes.  For example, a man 
in Colorado sought to adopt his partner to circumvent an ordinance that 
required persons living within the applicable zone to be family 
members.69  In addition to tax and housing benefits, Turnipseed believes 
there could be many benefits of adult adoption, including the following: 
 
access to health insurance coverage and other employee benefits 
of the adoptor; allowing recovery in tort actions and survivor 
benefits; . . . life insurance beneficiary designations; Social 
Security payments; consent authorizations or visitation privileges 
 
60. Id. at 1099. 
61. Id.  
62. See infra text accompanying notes 63–70. 
63. Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilities of Estate Planning Attorneys in 
the Representation of Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 86 (2003).  
64. Id.  
65. See Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 105.  As of right now, eight states still collect an 
inheritance tax.  See  McGuireWoods  LLP,  McGuireWoods  LLP  State  Death  Tax  Chart 
(Mar.  26,  2012),  http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/taxation/ 
state_death_tax_chart.pdf. 
66. 623 A.2d at 1096. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 1099. 
69. W.D.A. v. City & Cnty. of Denver (In re W.D.A.), 632 P.2d 582, 583 (Colo. 1981). 
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relating to hospitals, jails, and other governmental agencies; 
attainment of immigration status; obtaining royalty status; taking 
advantage of rent control; and . . . permitting an adopted child of 
a university employee to enroll in said university, or a reciprocal 
university, free of charge.70 
 
Thus, whether seeking to codify a parent–child relationship or to 
receive some other benefits, there are many motivations for seeking an 
adult adoption. 
C.  Adopting a Partner 
There is another area involving partners, both heterosexual and 
homosexual, who have attempted to adopt one another.  In regards to 
homosexual adoption, Turnipseed writes that “[f]or homosexual people 
in jurisdictions that do not recognize same-sex marriage (or something 
close that yields many of the same benefits and burdens), adoption is 
one darn sure (or darn-close to darn sure) way of ensuring inheritance, 
albeit drastic.”71  To oppose spouse and partner adoptions, courts have 
based their decisions on grounds such as “(1) non-statutory public 
policy; (2) very narrow statutory interpretation; (3) fraud on the court 
by attempting to conceal the sexual relationship; and/or (4) incest-
related arguments.”72  Courts supporting the right of spouses and 
partners to adopt argue simply that “adoption is purely a statutory 
creation and, if the statute says you can adopt anyone, then you can 
adopt anyone—case closed.”73 
The first reason that courts reject partner-adoption is public policy.74  
The most famous cases rejecting partner-adoption come from New 
York.  The first time the New York courts addressed the issue was in In 
re Adoption of Adult Anonymous, where the court allowed one partner 
to adopt the other.75  Subsequently, however, the New York courts have 
held that one partner, whether homosexual or heterosexual, may not 
adopt the other.76  This trend was demonstrated in a later case, where a 
fifty-seven-year-old man attempted to adopt his fifty-year-old partner, 
 
70. Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 105–06 (footnotes omitted). 
71. Id. at 102. 
72. Id. at 111 (footnotes omitted). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. 435 N.Y.S.2d 527, 527, 531 (Fam. Ct. 1981). 
76. In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984). 
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with whom he had been living for twenty-five years.77  The New York 
statute simply states that “an adult unmarried person . . . may adopt 
another person.”78  The court in In re Adoption of Robert Paul P. 
emphasized the necessity of a parent–child relationship in order to 
approve an adoption and stated that adoption “is plainly not a quasi-
matrimonial vehicle to provide nonmarried partners with a legal 
imprimatur for their sexual relationship, be it heterosexual or 
homosexual.”79  The court believed that adopting a partner was “wholly 
inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a parent–
child relationship for the welfare of the child.”80  Though New York 
public policy prevents partner-adoption, most courts in other states 
faced with this question have allowed the adoption and have not found 
the parties’ relationship to be preventative.81 
A second way that courts reject partner adoption is by interpreting 
the adoption statute narrowly, only allowing adoptions when there is a 
specified relationship.82  For example, the court in In re Adoption of 
Robert Paul P. required the petitioners to establish a parent–child 
relationship to grant the adoption, even though the New York statute 
has no such limitation;83 “an adult unmarried person . . . may adopt 
another person.”84  Another example is In re Jones, where a thirty-year-
old married man attempted to adopt his twenty-year-old lover, who was 
also married.85  The court stated that the probate judge “is clothed with 
judicial discretion as he considers a petition where one adult seeks to 
adopt another” and that “this court has repeatedly said that a statute 
will not be construed so as to achieve an absurd, meaningless, or 
patently inane result.”86  Thus, in addition to public policy arguments, 
 
77. Id. 
78. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (Consol. 2009). 
79. 471 N.E.2d at 425. 
80. Id. (citing Orsini v. Blasi (In re Adoption of Malpica-Orsini), 331 N.E.2d 486, 489 
(N.Y. 1975)). 
81. Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 114–15; see also In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 
1095, 1097 (Del. 1993) (noting that “[m]any jurisdictions limit inquiry into the motives or 
purposes of an adult adoption”). 
82. Russell G. Donaldson, Annot., Marital or Sexual Relationship Between Parties as 
Affecting Right to Adopt, 42 A.L.R.4th 776, 785 (1985); Turnipseed, supra note 39, at 111. 
83. 471 N.E.2d at 425. 
84. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (Consol. 2009). 
85. 411 A.2d 910, 910 (R.I. 1980). 
86. Id. at 911. 
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courts also reject partner-adoption by construing the adoption statute 
narrowly. 
Though some courts reject partner-adoption because of public policy 
or statutory construction, some courts have allowed partner-adoption.  
One author notes, 
 
It has been held that where the adoption statute in question is 
clearly worded and unlimited as to the persons included therein, the 
courts are without authority to create any judicial gloss thereon, so 
that there would be no justification for limiting the adoption 
statute’s applicability to persons not specifically excluded 
therefrom.87 
 
For example, the court in Bedinger v. Graybill’s Executor & Trustee 
stated that “[i]t is important to note that the statute is unrestricted and 
unqualified.  It authorizes any adult person to adopt any person of any 
age.”88  Thus, the court is “bound by the statutory law as written and 
cannot write into it an exception which the legislature did not make.”89  
The court in Bedinger held that even if the adoption was “incongruous” 
with the statute, if the statute did not specifically prevent the adoption, 
the court was not at liberty to prevent the adoption either.90  In fact, the 
Bedinger court was also faced with a public policy argument, to which 
they responded as follows: 
 
 It is ably argued by the appellants that the adoption of a wife 
is void as against public policy.  Public policy is a vague and 
indefinite term and is incapable of accurate and precise 
definition.  The public policy of a state is to be found in its 
constitution and statutes, and it is only in the absence of any 
expressed or implied declaration in these instruments that it may 
be declared by judicial decisions.  If the legislature has spoken 
clearly and constitutionally, the courts may not substitute their 
own ideas of public policy.91 
 
 
87. Donaldson, supra note 82, at 786. 
88. 302 S.W.2d 594, 598 (Ky. 1957). 
89. Id. at 599. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
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Thus, the court concluded that unless the statute specifically 
prohibits the adoption, or a specific pronouncement of public policy is 
known or can be gleaned from the statutes, the court is without 
authority to prevent the adoption.92 
D.  Consequences of Adoption 
Although adult adoption has the benefit of codifying a familial 
relationship between the adoptor and the adoptee, one of the biggest 
drawbacks is that the process is generally irrevocable.93  The adoptor 
cannot simply revoke the process in order to disinherit the adoptee, 
despite “adoptor’s remorse.”94  One famous case on point is that of 
Doris Duke, who was a beneficiary of a trust executed by her father, 
James Duke.95  In 1988, Doris Duke, at age seventy-five, adopted 
Chandi Heffner, who was thirty-five at the time of the adoption.96  Duke 
subsequently regretted adopting Heffner, and wrote the following in her 
will: 
 
[I]t is my intention that Chandi Heffner not be deemed to be my 
child for the purposes of disposing of property under this my 
Will . . . .  Furthermore, it is not my intention, nor do I believe 
that it was ever my father’s intention, that Chandi Heffner be 
deemed to be a child or lineal descendant of mine for purposes 
of disposing of the trust estate . . . .   
 I am extremely troubled by the realization that Chandi 
Heffner may use my 1988 adoption of her . . . to attempt to 
benefit financially under the terms of either of the trusts created 
by my father. . . .  I do not wish her to benefit from my estate.97 
 
In Heffner’s suit against the trustees of the Doris Duke Trust, the 
court ruled that Heffner was not allowed to take under the trust as the 
 
92. Id. at 600. 
93. Snodgrass, supra note 46, at 75.  But see T.C. Williams, Annot., Annulment or 
Vacation of Adoption Decree by Adopting Parent or Natural Parent Consenting to Adoption, 2 
A.L.R.2d 887, 903–09 (1948) (identifying considerations of the best interests of the child, 
misconduct by the child, fraud or duress, and mutual consent as possible avenues for 
revocation by adoptors). 
94. Williams, supra note 93, at 903–05 (explaining that courts are reluctant to disturb the 
new status of the child unless it is in the best interests of the child). 
95. In re Trust of Duke, 702 A.2d 1008, 1011 (N.J. Ch. 1995). 
96. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 107. 
97. Id. at 107–08. 
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descendant of Duke because the meaning of “lineal descendant” did not 
include adoptees at the time the trusts were executed, in 1924.98  
However, Heffner sued the executors of the trusts created by Doris’s 
father and claimed that Doris had promised to support Heffner.99  
Before the suit went to trial, the executors of the trusts settled with 
Heffner for sixty-five million dollars; thus, even though Heffner was not 
deemed a lineal descendant of James Duke, she ended up profiting 
enormously from the adoption.100  Therefore, because of the irrevocable 
nature of adoption, parties contemplating an adoption must be 
absolutely sure of their decision.101 
Considering the irrevocability of adoption, why resort to such a 
drastic action over other methods of property disposition, such as wills, 
trusts, insurance, inter vivos gifts, and pension plans?  Each of the 
nonprobate options has drawbacks.  One nonprobate option is giving 
the partner inter vivos gifts.  However, inter vivos gifts are irrevocable 
and only effective if one partner is significantly wealthier than the 
other.102  Other options include designating the partner as the 
beneficiary under an insurance policy or creating a joint bank account.103  
These strategies are similarly effective only if one partner is well-to-do 
and are only effective for transferring money, not for transferring 
property.104  One practical alternative is to create a revocable inter vivos 
trust.  With this option, the parties can protect their assets from claims 
of undue influence, incapacity, and fraud more effectively than through 
a will.105  In a trust, there is a record of many transactions, and the court 
will be hesitant, particularly due to the “administrative nightmare,” to 
overturn the transactions in the trust.106  However, many clients are 
 
98. Duke, 702 A.2d at 1021. 
99. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 108. 
100. Id. 
101. Even though the adoption itself is irrevocable, the adoptor could simply disinherit 
the adoptee (of the adoptor’s own property) in a later instrument.  But at that point, the 
parties are going around in circles—especially if one of the reasons for the adoption was to 
defeat claims by the adoptor’s family of undue influence, incapacity, fraud, and the like.  The 
disinherited adoptee is able to contest the adoptor’s will.  See Calvin Massey, Designation of 
Heirs: A Modest Proposal to Diminish Will Contests, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577, 586–
87 (2003) (stating that “such disinheritance invites yet another will contest”). 
102. Id. at 587. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 579. 
106. Id. at 579, 587 (noting that it would be very difficult for a court to “unwind” a 
settlor’s transactions with the trust if the court subsequently finds that the settlor lacked 
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reluctant to allow another person to hold legal title to their property or 
are intimidated by the seemingly “complex” nature of trusts.107  In fact, 
studies done in collateral areas, such as why people die intestate and 
what kinds of people execute testamentary documents, have found that 
people with more education and money are more likely to die with an 
estate plan.108  Thus, a trust may be too expensive or “complex” for the 
average property owner.  “While a fully funded revocable inter vivos 
trust may be a reasonably effective remedy to the problem, this and 
other standard remedies are likely to remain the province of the 
sophisticated and affluent who employ equally sophisticated and 
affluent estate planners.”109 
IV.  COMPARISON OF JURISDICTIONS 
With the background information in place, this Part outlines and 
compares the status of adoptees in Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, and 
Minnesota.  For each jurisdiction, this Part describes the statute on 
adoption, describes the statute on inheritance rights of adoptees, and 
discusses the cases that interpret these statutes.  It compares several 
main factors: (1) statutes regarding adoption and inheritance rights 
surrounding adoption, (2) early and modern attitudes toward adoption, 
and (3) rights of adult adoptees. 
A.  Wisconsin 
1. Statutes 
Wisconsin’s adoption statute is very broad: in Wisconsin, “[a]n adult 
may be adopted by any other adult, who is a resident of this state.”110  
The inheritance rights of adopted persons, however, are more 
restrictive.  In Wisconsin, an adoptee is treated as the biological child of 
the adoptive parents, and the parents are treated as the biological 
 
capacity or was unduly influenced); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 44, at 206 (noting that 
“[a]lthough trusts, too, can be attacked on grounds of incapacity and undue influence, as a 
practical matter it is harder to upset a trust if the settlor had a course of dealing with the 
trustee to evidence competence and the absence of influence”). 
107. See Massey, supra note 101, at 579, 587. 
108. See Gary, supra note 51, at 16–17.  Gary recaps several studies performed on who 
dies intestate and why this is so.  The studies have found that the older a person is, the more 
likely they are to have an estate plan.  Id.  Similarly, the wealthier a person is, the likelier he 
or she is to have an estate plan.  Id. 
109. Massey, supra note 101, at 584 (footnote omitted). 
110. WIS. STAT. § 882.01 (2009–2010). 
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parents of the adoptee for inheritance from and through each other if 
one of the following three conditions exists: 
 
 1. The decedent or transferor is the adoptive parent or 
adopted child. 
 2. The [adoptee] was a minor at the time of adoption. 
 3. The [adoptor] raised the [adoptee] in a parent-like 
relationship beginning on or before the child’s 15th birthday and 
lasting for a substantial period or until adulthood.111 
 
Thus, despite the broad adoption statute, the inheritance rights 
surrounding an adoption are more limited. 
2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption 
Until 1966, Wisconsin had an unfavorable policy toward adoptees 
both intestate and in testamentary dispositions.112  An example of 
Wisconsin’s policy toward adoptees in intestate cases is In re Matzke’s 
Estate, where the supreme court held that because the adoption statutes 
were silent on the question of inheritance rights of adoptees, an adult 
adoptee had no right to take from her adoptive grandmother’s intestate 
estate.113  In the case, the decedent had three children, two of whom 
predeceased her.114  One of the predeceased children had an adopted 
daughter.115  The decedent died intestate, and the statutes provided that 
personal property and land should be distributed to children and to 
children of any deceased child by representation.116  The adoption 
statute stated that an adopted child would be treated as the child of the 
adoptive parents, but was silent on the question of inheritance from 
anyone other than the adoptive parent.117  The court held that the 
adopted grandchild was not entitled to take under the statute of descent 
or distribution.118 
 
111. Id. § 854.20(b).  In Wisconsin, a person becomes an “adult” at the age of eighteen.  
Id. § 990.01(3). 
112. See infra text accompanying notes 123–29. 
113. Ruch v. Bender (In re Estate of Matzke), 250 Wis. 204, 208, 26 N.W.2d 659, 661 
(1947). 
114. Id. at 205, 26 N.W.2d at 659. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 207, 26 N.W.2d at 660–61. 
118. Id. at 208, 26 N.W.2d at 661. 
18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  9:58 PM 
1062 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [95:1043 
An example of Wisconsin’s policy toward adoptees in a testamentary 
disposition is In re Estate of Uihlein, in which the supreme court held 
that the adoptive children of the decedent’s daughter were not allowed 
to take under the decedent’s will—a classic “stranger-to-the-adoption” 
ruling.119  In the case, the decedent died before his grandchildren were 
adopted.120  In attempting to determine whether the adopted children 
could take as beneficiaries under the will, the court determined that the 
statute “changes the legal status of an adopted child but it does not 
purport to make an adopted child the issue of a parent.”121  The supreme 
court stated that when there is a provision in a will “made for the child 
of some person other than testator and a child is adopted by that person 
after the death of testator, the adopted child is not, in the absence of 
contrary compelling circumstances, entitled to share in a gift to children 
or issue of the third person.”122 
In 1966, Wisconsin’s policy toward adoptees became more liberal 
when the supreme court in In re Will of Adler reversed the stranger-to-
the-adoption rule.123  The court held that the adopted daughter of the 
testator’s niece could inherit under a trust for the benefit of the 
testator’s nieces and nephews and their issue.124  In the case, with facts 
nearly identical to those in In re Estate of Uihlein, the testator 
established a testamentary trust for the benefit of his nieces and 
nephews and their issue, one of whom had adopted a child after the 
testator’s death but prior to the distribution of the trust.125  At the time 
In re Estate of Uihlein was decided, adopted children could not inherit 
under the statutes because they were not “heirs of the body.”126  
However, when In re Will of Adler was decided, the adoption statute 
provided that “the effect of the order of adoption is to completely 
change the legal status of the adopted person from that of a child of the 
natural parents to that of a child of the adoptive parents.”127  About 
 
119. 269 Wis. 170, 177, 68 N.W.2d 816, 821 (1955). 
120. Id. at 178, 68 N.W.2d at 821. 
121. Id. at 173, 68 N.W.2d at 819.  “Issue” was “construed as meaning blood 
descendants.”  Id. at 177, 68 N.W.2d at 821. 
122. Id. at 176, 68 N.W.2d at 820. 
123. Smith v. Reinhart (In re Will of Adler), 30 Wis. 2d 250, 263, 140 N.W.2d 219, 226 
(1966). 
124. Id. at 263, 140 N.W.2d at 226. 
125. Id. at 255, 260, 263, 140 N.W.2d at 222, 225, 226. 
126. Id. at 260, 140 N.W.2d at 225. 
127. Id. at 257, 140 N.W.2d at 223 (quoting WIS. STAT. § 322.07(1) (1947)). 
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reversing the “stranger-to-the-adoption” rule, the court stated the 
following regarding the theory of the importance of blood relationships: 
 
 This theory is completely contrary to the present attitude of 
the family and of the public toward adoption.  The tendency, 
desire, and public policy in every adoption is to completely 
absorb an adopted child into a family unit and to make his status 
in fact indistinguishable from that of a natural child, not only in 
his relationship with his adoptive parents, but, also, with the 
general public and with relatives who are not immediate 
members of the family circle.128 
 
Thus, Wisconsin endorsed a more favorable policy toward adoptees 
starting in 1966.129 
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees 
Today, adoptees will inherit property only if the transferor of the 
property is also the adoptor, if the adoptee was adopted before the age 
of eighteen, or the adoptee was raised in the adoptor’s household on or 
before the adoptee’s fifteenth birthday.130  In 2004, in In re Estate of 
Pawlisch, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that an adult adoptee 
was not entitled to take under the trust of his adoptive grandfather 
because he was not adopted as a minor, nor was he raised in the 
adoptive parent’s household before the age of fifteen, as the statutes 
require.131  In the case, the donor established a testamentary trust for the 
benefit of his son Carl and Carl’s issue.132  Carl did not have any 
children, but he adopted his nephew Hans when Hans was forty-seven.133  
The statute at the time of the will’s execution included adopted children 
within the meaning of “issue” in a class gift if the adoptee “was adopted 
after having been raised as a member of the household by the adoptive 
parent from the child’s 15th birthday or before.”134  The court held that 
the adoption did not entitle Hans to take the remainder of the trust 
 
128. Id. at 262, 140 N.W.2d at 225. 
129. See id. 
130. WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010). 
131. Pawlisch v. Otto V. Pawlisch Trust (In re Estate of Pawlisch), No. 03-1430, 2004 WL 
35466, ¶¶ 11, 24, 26 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 8, 2004). 
132. Id. ¶¶ 8–10.  
133. Id. ¶ 11. 
134. WIS. STAT. § 851.51(3) (1991–1992). 
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assets because the donative document did not include adopted children 
within the meaning of “issue,” nor did the statute allow adult adoptees 
to take within a class gift because Hans was not raised in Carl’s 
household before the age of fifteen.135 
B.  Illinois 
1. Statutes 
In Illinois, adults may be adopted if they have “resided in the home 
of the persons intending to adopt [them] at any time for more than 2 
years continuously preceding the commencement of an adoption 
proceeding, or in the alternative that such persons are related to [them] 
within a degree set forth in the definition of a related child.”136  For an 
adopted child to inherit from the adopting parents and the lineal and 
collateral kindred of the parents, the child must either be adopted by or 
reside with the adopting parents before reaching age eighteen.137 
2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption 
In Illinois, similar to Wisconsin, there was an early preference for 
heirs related by blood over those related by adoption.  For example, in 
1924 in Miller v. Wick, the testator’s will stated that his nephew was to 
receive the principal of the trust at “such time in his life as he shall have 
a child, his lawful issue.”138  The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that 
an adopted child was not the “lawful issue” of the testator’s heir and was 
not entitled to take under the terms of the trust established by the 
testator’s will.139  By 1947, however, the Illinois courts were more open-
 
135. Pawlisch, 2004 WL 35466, ¶¶ 24–26. 
136. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/3 (West 2009).  The term “related child” means “a 
child subject to adoption where either or both of the adopting parents stands in any of the 
following relationships to the child by blood or marriage: parent, grand-parent, brother, sister, 
step-parent, step-grandparent, step-brother, step-sister, uncle, aunt, great-uncle, great-aunt, 
or cousin of first degree.”  Id. 50/1. 
137. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2–4 (West 2007).  Even though the statute only 
discusses the inheritance rights of an “adopted child,” the Illinois Appellate Court explained 
that the legislature was referring to the “parent–child” relationship created by the adoption, 
and that the word “child” cannot be interpreted to mean “minor” since Illinois permits adult 
adoptions.  Roeder v. Buckman (In re Estate of Brittin), 664 N.E.2d 687, 690–91 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). 
138. 142 N.E. 490, 491 (Ill. 1924). 
139. Id. at 492 (noting that “[w]e think the rational and reasonable understanding of 
testator’s purpose, to be arrived at from the language employed in the will, is that he wished 
appellant to have a child born in lawful wedlock, in which event, if the child attained the age 
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minded toward the inheritance rights of adoptees; for example, in In re 
Harmount’s Estate, the appellate court held that in the case of a 
predeceased legatee, the adopted children of the deceased legatee were 
entitled to receive the inheritance.140 
The progression of the “stranger-to-the-adoption” rule in Illinois is 
similar to that of Wisconsin.  Documents executed before 1955 were 
generally held to exclude adopted children; for example, in Neissl v. 
Hartman, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the adoptive grandchild 
of the testator was not entitled to take under the testator’s testamentary 
trust.141  The terms of trust authorized the testator’s children to appoint 
trust funds to their own children.142  However, the document was 
executed before the adoption occurred, and the testator was unaware of 
the existence of the adopted children.143  In 1955, the statute governing 
the inheritance rights of adoptees was amended.144  The amended statute 
declared that by default, adoptees would be entitled to inherit from the 
collateral kindred of their adoptive parents.145  For example, in Martin v. 
Gerdes, the adoptee was entitled to take in the testator’s estate even 
though the adoption occurred after the testamentary documents were 
executed because “an adopted child is a natural child unless the terms of 
the instrument ‘plainly’ indicate otherwise.”146  The court did not find 
 
of three years, appellant should become the owner of the principal of the trust fund”).   
140. Michael v. Michael (In re Harmount’s Estate), 83 N.E.2d 756, 760 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1949).  When this case was decided, 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 14 (1947) stated that adopted 
children could not inherit “property from a lineal or collateral kindred of the adopting parent 
per stirpes or property expressly limited to the body of the adopting parent.”  In re 
Harmount’s Estate, 83 N.E.2d at 757.  However, the court decided that under the anti-lapse 
statute, 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 49 (1947), the descendants of a predeceased legatee, including 
adopted children, were allowed to inherit property that the predeceased legatee was entitled 
to inherit.  In re Harmount’s Estate, 83 N.E.2d at 757–58. 
141. 196 N.E.2d 528, 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963).  In another example, the Supreme Court of 
Illinois looked at the adoption statutes from 1941.  Ford v. Newman, 396 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ill. 
1979).  The court found it persuasive that the testamentary document was executed before the 
adoption occurred and that the Illinois statute at the time prohibited adoptees from taking 
property from the adopting parent’s collateral kindred.  Id. at 541. 
142. Neissl, 196 N.E.2d at 528. 
143. Id. at 530. 
144. See Martin v. Gerdes, 523 N.E.2d 607, 610 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (discussing the 
change in the law that overturned the “stranger-to-the-adoption” presumption).  The new law 
was not applied retroactively, which resulted in courts construing any document executed 
before September 1, 1955, under the old law; the old law stated that adoptees could not 
inherit from the collateral kindred of their parents.  Id. (quoting 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 2–4 
(1955)). 
145. 3 ILL. REV. STAT. § 2–4 (1955). 
146. Id. at 612. 
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any language in the instrument that “plainly” indicated an intent to 
exclude adopted children.147 
Despite the more inclusive policy toward adoptees, the language of 
the testamentary document can override the statute; it is only in the 
absence of language that the court can use the statute as an interpretive 
aid.148  For example, in Cross v. Cross, the testator gave her son the 
power of appointment to distribute the contents of her trust to her 
“descendants” through his will.149  The Illinois Appellate Court held that 
the adopted grandson was not entitled to take under the will because the 
language “descendant” signified that the testator intended her estate to 
go to a blood relative.150 
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees 
Following the statutes on the inheritance rights of adoptees, the 
courts have been more willing to grant adult adoptees inheritance rights.  
For example, in In re Estate of Brittin, the Illinois Appellate Court 
permitted the adoptive grandchildren of the testator to inherit from the 
testator’s intestate estate.151  In the case, the decedent had raised 
William Eugene from the time he was three and adopted Eugene when 
he was forty-six, at which time Eugene had five children.152  The court 
stated that there was “no statutory distinction between an adopted adult 
and an adopted minor with respect to the nature of the legal relationship 
 
147. Id. at 611.  The Illinois Supreme Court, in First National Bank v. King, also 
discussed what constitutes clear intent to exclude adoptees and concluded that “the testator’s 
use of the terms ‘lawful descendants’ and ‘per stirpes’ are not sufficient to demonstrate by 
clear and convincing evidence that [the testator] intended to exclude adopted children.”  651 
N.E.2d 127, 131 (Ill. 1995).  Another case which discussed the evidence needed to rebut the 
presumption that adoptees are included within testamentary documents is Altenheim German 
Home v. Bank of America, in which the testamentary instrument allowed adopted 
grandchildren to take in the estate, but was silent on whether adopted great-grandchildren 
could take in the estate.  875 N.E.2d 1172, 1174–75 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).  The court held that 
the instrument’s silence was not enough to rebut the presumption of inclusion.  Id. at 1182.  
The courts have even gone so far as to say that language such as “natural children” and “heirs 
of the body” is not enough to overcome the presumption.  See Roller v. Allison (In re Estate 
of Roller), 880 N.E.2d 549, 559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
148. See supra note 147 and sources cited therein (giving examples of what language 
does not overcome the inclusive presumption toward adoptees). 
149. 532 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988). 
150. Id. at 489. 
151. Roeder v. Buckman (In re Estate of Brittin), 664 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1996). 
152. Id. at 688. 
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created between the adoptee and the adopting parent.”153  Thus, because 
a parent–child relationship was created between the testator and 
Eugene, Eugene’s children were considered the natural grandchildren of 
the testator.154  Even though the inheritance statute only discusses the 
inheritance rights of an adopted “child,” both adopted children and 
adopted adults are allowed to inherit from their adoptive parents as if 
they were natural children.155 
C.  Indiana 
1. Statutes 
Indiana’s statutes regarding adoption and inheritance rights are very 
favorable to adoptees.  Indiana has a very broad adult adoption statute: 
“An individual who is at least eighteen (18) years of age may be adopted 
by a resident of Indiana,” with proper jurisdiction and the consent of the 
adult.156  According to the Indiana Statutes,  
 
 For all purposes of intestate succession, including succession 
by, through, or from a person, both lineal and collateral, an 
adopted child shall be treated as a natural child of the child’s 
adopting parents, and the child shall cease to be treated as a 
child of the natural parents and of any previous adopting 
parents.157 
 
The Indiana Statutes also make it clear that courts should presumptively 
include an adoptee when construing a will or a trust if that person was 
adopted before age twenty-one and adopted before the death of the 
testator.158 
 
153. Id. at 690. 
154. Id. at 691. 
155. Id. at 690–91. 
156. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-19-2-1 (LexisNexis 2007). 
157. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-2-8 (LexisNexis 2011). 
158. Id. § 29-1-6-1(d) (providing that when a court is construing a will, “any person 
adopted prior to the person’s twenty-first birthday before the death of the testator shall be 
considered the child of the adopting parent or parents and not the child of the natural . . . 
parents”). 
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2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption 
In 1953, Indiana reversed the presumption that an adoptee cannot 
inherit property from a testator or deceased person intestate who was a 
stranger to the adoption.159  The new statute specifically addresses both 
testate and intestate situations and instructs courts that in interpreting 
wills, “any person adopted prior to the person’s twenty-first birthday 
before the death of the testator shall be considered the child of the 
adopting parent or parents.”160  However, the statute is not applied 
retroactively.161  An example of a case applying the new presumption is 
Adams v. Slater, in which the child of the decedent’s adopted daughter 
was entitled to inherit from her adoptive grandmother’s estate.162  The 
Indiana statute at the time, which was very similar to the present statute, 
stated that for the purposes of inheritance, an adult adoptee is “entitled 
to inherit as a child from the adopting parent or parents.”163 The court 
stated that 
 
[I]t has no right to allow collateral relatives to disturb either the 
relationship of the adoptive parent to the adopted child or the 
relationship of the adoptive parent to the adopted child’s natural 
child who, in both a legal and moral sense, should retain all the 
rights of a natural grandchild.164 
 
 
159. Lutz v. Fortune, 758 N.E.2d 77, 82–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).  The stranger-to-
adoption presumption remained in effect for trusts, however, until 2003.  The 2003 statute, 
which presumptively includes adoptees within a trust executed by someone other than the 
adoptor, is to be applied retroactively unless inclusion would either adversely affect a right 
given to any beneficiary or give someone a share who was not intended to benefit from the 
trust.  See Paloutzian v. Taggart, 931 N.E.2d 921, 928–31 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing IND. 
CODE ANN. § 30-4-1-4 (West 2009)). 
160. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d). 
161. See Lutz, 758 N.E.2d at 83 (applying the rule at the time the document was 
executed to determine whether an adopted grandchild could inherit in her adoptive 
grandfather’s trust for the benefit of his grandchildren).  The court applied the statute at the 
time the document was executed, which excluded adopted children and grandchildren unless 
there was “something in the extraneous circumstances to rebut said presumption.”  Id.  
Because there were no extraneous circumstances favoring the adopted grandchild, the 
adoptee was not allowed to inherit from the trust.  Id. 
162. 175 N.E.2d 706, 710–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1961). 
163. Id. at 708 (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 6-208 (1953)). 
164. Id. at 710–11. 
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 Similar to Illinois, the terms of an inter vivos trust supersede the 
default probate laws.165  For instance, in Walz v. Walz, the court held 
that a child the settlor adopted after the execution of his trust was not 
entitled to take where the settlor’s natural children were individually 
named as beneficiaries of the trust.166 
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees 
The statutes provide that an adoptee is presumptively included in a 
will or trust if adopted before age twenty-one and adopted before the 
death of the testator.167  Unless the testamentary document indicates 
otherwise, any person adopted after turning twenty-one will be excluded 
from a class gift.168  Thus, the policy toward adult adoptees is slightly 
more generous in Indiana than in Wisconsin and Illinois, but not by 
much.169 
D.  Minnesota 
1. Statutes 
In Minnesota, “any adult person may be adopted, regardless of the 
adult person’s residence” with the consent of the adult to be adopted.170  
The adoption “establishes a parent–child relationship between the 
adopting parent or parents and the person adopted, including the right 
 
165. See Walz v. Walz (In re Walz’s Living Trust), 423 N.E.2d 729, 730–32, 737 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1981) (holding that a child the testator adopted was not entitled to take under the 
testator’s inter vivos trust where the terms of his trust specifically stated that the trust was for 
the benefit of his two natural children to share equally).  The case also discussed the 
difference between a testamentary document, which will be subject to the laws of probate, 
such as a will and testamentary trust, and a non-testamentary document, such as an inter vivos 
trust, which is not controlled by the probate laws (rather, the statutes are used as an 
interpretive aid).  Id. at 732–34. 
166. Id. at 730–31, 737. 
167. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d) (LexisNexis 2011) (providing that when a court is 
construing a will, “any person adopted prior to the person's twenty-first birthday before the 
death of the testator shall be considered the child of the adopting parent or parents and not 
the child of the natural . . . parents”). 
168. See id. 
169. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010) (an adoptee will only take if the decedent is 
also the adoptor, the adoptee was adopted as a minor, or the adoptee was raised in the 
household of the adopter prior to turning fifteen); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2–4 (West 
2007) (an adoptee will inherit from the adopting parents and their “lineal and collateral 
kindred” if the adoptee is adopted by or resides with the adopting parents before the adoptee 
turns eighteen). 
170. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.241 (Supp. 2011). 
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to inherit . . . .”171  Because a parent–child relationship is established, 
“the parent is a parent of the child and the child is a child of the parent 
for the purposes of intestate succession.”172  Additionally, Minnesota has 
established a rule that “[a]dopted individuals . . ., and their respective 
descendants if appropriate to the class, are included in class gifts and 
other terms of relationship in accordance with the rules for intestate 
succession.”173 
2. Early and Modern Attitudes Toward Adoption 
Minnesota has a liberal policy toward adoptees: whether intestate or 
in a testamentary document, “adopted children stand in the same 
position as biological children in all respects.”174  Thus, words such as 
“issue,” “children,” and “descendants” will presumptively include 
adoptees.175  Further, words such as “issue of her body,” without further 
explanation, are not sufficient to exclude adoptees.176  In fact, the 
Minnesota courts, in accordance with the statutes, have made it very 
clear that adoptees and natural children are to be treated equally as long 
as there is not explicit language to the contrary: 
 
We have come to realize that it is not the biological act of 
begetting offspring—which is done even by animals without any 
family ties—but the emotional and spiritual experience of living 
together that creates a family.  The family relationship is created 
far more by love, understanding, and mutual recognition of 
reciprocal duties and bonds, than by physical genesis.  The 
marriage ceremony gives recognition to this fact as between 
spouses.  Formal adoption recognizes this fact as between 
parents and children.177 
 
In the case In re Will of Patrick, the Minnesota Supreme Court held 
that the adopted nephew of the testator was presumptively entitled to 
take under the testator’s trust, which was for the benefit of the testator’s 
 
171. Id. 
172. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-116 (Supp. 2011). 
173. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-705 (West 2002). 
174. In re Trusts Created by Agreement with Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 166 (Minn. 
1977) (quoting Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 
888, 890 (Minn. 1960)). 
175. In re Will of Patrick, 106 N.W.2d at 890. 
176. Harrington, 250 N.W.2d at 167. 
177. In re Will of Patrick, 106 N.W.2d at 890 (footnote omitted). 
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siblings and their descendants.178  In another case, the adoptee was 
entitled to take from the trust established by her adoptive grandparent 
because of the presumption in favor of adoptees, even though the trust 
was for the benefit of the testator’s daughter and the “issue of her 
body.”179 
3. Rights of Adult Adoptees 
The inclusive presumptions established in Minnesota extend to adult 
adoptees.180  For example, in In re Trust Created Under Agreement with 
Lane, the settlor’s adoptive great-grandson, who was adopted as an 
adult, was entitled to take from the settlor’s trust.181  In the case, the 
settlor, who adopted his wife’s brother, created a trust for the benefit of 
the brother’s sons (his two grandsons) and their issue, but he specifically 
disinherited the brother’s daughter (his granddaughter).182  One of the 
testator’s grandsons, George Barbour, was unmarried and had no issue, 
but he decided to adopt Charles DeWitt, the adult son of the testator’s 
disinherited granddaughter.183  The court stated that “the long history of 
embracing adult adoption, combined with the lack of explicit exclusion 
of the children of [the testator’s granddaughter], leads to the conclusion 
that the district court did not err in holding that Charles DeWitt was 
George Barbour’s son and a beneficiary of the trust in question.”184 
In accordance with the broad adoption statute, Minnesota courts 
have held that neither the motivations behind an adoption nor public 
policy arguments are relevant in deciding whether to grant the 
adoption.185  In In re Adoption of Berston, a twenty-nine-year-old 
petitioned to adopt his mother to bring her within the provisions of a 
trust created by his father.186  The court allowed the adoption, stating 
that the statute “unequivocally authorizes a petition for the adoption of 
 
178. Id. at 892 (describing the presumption in favor of adoptees and remanding to the 
trial court to determine if it was shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator 
intended to exclude the adoptee).  This case also provides evidence that Minnesota had 
overturned the stranger-to-the-adoption rule by 1960.  See id. 
179. Harrington, 250 N.W.2d at 167. 
180. See infra text accompanying notes 181–84. 
181. 660 N.W.2d 421, 427 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
182. Id. at 423–24. 
183. Id. at 424. 
184. Id. at 427. 
185. See Berston v. Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re Adoption of Berston), 206 
N.W.2d 28, 30 (Minn. 1973). 
186. Id. at 29. 
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‘an adult’ by ‘any person’ as to foreclose any limiting construction.  Any 
considerations of public policy are matters for reappraisal by legislative 
amendment.”187 
Thus, Minnesota has the most favorable policies for adult adoptees 
compared to the three states discussed above.  An adult adoptee will 
take intestate and in testamentary documents as long as there are not 
explicit words to the contrary.188  In contrast, in Wisconsin, adoptees will 
inherit property only if the transferor of the property is also the adoptor, 
if the adoptee was adopted as a minor, or the adoptee was raised in the 
adoptor’s household on or before his or her fifteenth birthday.189  In 
Illinois, adoptees will not be treated as a descendant of the adoptor if 
they were adopted after the age of eighteen or not raised in the 
adoptor’s household before their eighteenth birthday.190  Finally, in 
Indiana, unless the testamentary document indicates otherwise, any 
person adopted after he or she turns twenty-one will be excluded from a 
class gift.191 
V.  SOLUTIONS AND PROPOSALS 
Based on the jurisdictional comparison, which only scratches the 
surface of adult adoptees’ rights, this area of the law would benefit from 
reform aiming to create more uniformity across jurisdictions.  An 
adoptor who undertakes the drastic measure of adopting another adult 
usually has a close and loving relationship with the adoptee, and the 
goal of the adoption is to make the adoptee a genuine member of the 
family.  A default rule that uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s 
inheritance rights is in line with the adoptor’s motivation for the 
adoption.  Proposals that may alleviate the inconsistency include 
embracing a functional definition of “family,” allowing partners to 
designate an heir, and adopting a more inclusive uniform law on the 
inheritance rights of adult adoptees. 
 
187. Id. at 30. 
188. See supra text accompanying notes 182–187.  The Minnesota statutes are clear that 
adoptees are to be treated equally both intestate and in testamentary documents.  See MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 524.2-116 (Supp. 2011) (“[T]he parent is a parent of the child and the child is a 
child of the parent for the purposes of intestate succession.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.2-705 
(West 2002) (“Adopted individuals . . ., and their respective descendants if appropriate to the 
class, are included in class gifts and other terms of relationship in accordance with the rules 
for intestate succession.”).  
189. WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010). 
190. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2–4 (2007). 
191. IND. CODE ANN. § 29-1-6-1(d) (LexisNexis 2011). 
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A.  Functional Definition of Family 
Professor Mary Patricia Treuthart wrote an article explaining how 
the law and social institutions have not caught up with the way people 
exist as families today, and she proposed that instead of defining 
“family” through marriage, we should define “family” by an 
examination of the closeness of the relationship.192  She explains that 
 
The traditional family with a breadwinner-husband and a 
homemaker-wife who live with their biological children is 
certainly an anomaly in America today.  Although existing 
families have diverse characteristics, the functional aspects of 
this basic social unit remain the same: the provision of love and 
support to its members.  Social institutions and the law have not 
kept up with the changes in family life.  As a result, many groups 
which function as families are not recognized as such, and are 
denied benefits which society bestows upon families which 
resemble the traditional model, if only superficially.193 
 
The U.S. Census Bureau defines “family” as “a group of two people 
or more . . . related by birth, marriage, or adoption and residing 
together.”194  A survey done by an insurance company in 1989 asked 
1,200 random adults how they would define “family,” and a large 
majority responded with the following broad definition: “a group of 
people who love and care for one another.”195  Treuthart writes that 
defining a family based on marriage can be contradictory, since it is 
 
192. Mary Patricia Treuthart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of “Family,” 26 
GONZ. L. REV. 91, 92 (1990–1991); see also Gary, supra note 51, at 5 (proposing a similar idea 
and using a functional definition of family to define “family” in intestacy statutes).  Gary 
states that  
 
[a] functional definition of family . . . tries to determine what a family does, what 
functions family members perform for each other and what relationships family 
members have with each other.  The definition attempts to include as family 
members those who function as family members, those for whom close, loving, 
caring and nurturing family relationships exist. 
Gary, supra note 51, at 5. 
193. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 91–92. 
194. Current Population Survey (CPS)—Definitions and Explanations, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps/cpsdef.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2012); 
cf. Gary, supra note 51, at 27 (noting that “[i]ntestacy statutes almost uniformly use a formal 
definition of family: persons related by blood, marriage or adoption”). 
195. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 97. 
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neither permanent, nor requires “procreation, economic 
interdependence[, or] even sexual exclusivity.”196  However, “[d]efining 
a family as a community of persons performing the functions of a family 
would seem to do more to promote the underlying values on which the 
policy favoring marriage is based.”197 
Though Treuthart’s article focuses on a more functional definition of 
“family,” as an alternative to defining “family” based on marriage, her 
article is applicable to the area of adult adoption.  If the concept of 
“family” were defined by the functional relationship between people, an 
adult adoptee would certainly be presumptively included within the 
family unit.198  Uniformly including adult adoptees within a “family” 
seems in line with the changing social mores regarding what defines a 
family and who is included in a family.199  As the Minnesota Supreme 
Court stated, “We have come to realize that it is not the biological act of 
begetting offspring—which is done even by animals without any family 
ties—but the emotional and spiritual experience of living together that 
creates a family.”200 
Even though Treuthart’s theory is applicable to adult adoptions, this 
approach has the limitation of the vague concept of “family.”  How 
should “family” be defined?  If the legislature defines “family” by the 
nature of the relationship between parties, this will leave the court with 
a burden of subjectively analyzing that relationship, which would be a 
time-consuming process and essentially leave a large gap for courts to 
fill with their own social policies.  A more objective way to define 
“family” (and one that would be less burdensome for courts) would look 
at whether the parties share, for example, “economic responsibilities,” 
chores, and child-rearing.201  Instead of looking at the relationship 
between parties, courts could look at objective factors surrounding the 
relationship.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in determining 
 
196. Id. at 98. 
197. Id. 
198. Any testamentary dispositions excluding the adult adoptee would have to be 
respected by the courts. 
199. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 91 n.1 (noting that a “traditional” family with a 
working father, stay-at-home mother, and children constitutes only six percent of families as 
of 1979 and that as of 1989, only 27% of U.S. households consisted of two parents with 
children, whereas in 1970 forty percent of households had two parents and children.). 
200. Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 
(Minn. 1960). 
201. Treuthart, supra note 192, at 113. 
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whether halfway house residents could be considered a “family” for the 
purposes of zoning regulations, stated that the residents 
 
must exhibit a kind of stability, permanency and functional 
lifestyle which is equivalent to that of a traditional family 
unit. . . .  The individual lifestyles of the residents and the 
transient nature of their residencies would not permit the group 
to possess the elements of stability and permanency which have 
long been associated with single-family occupancy.202 
 
An approach that combines objective factors, such as sharing 
“economic responsibilities” and household tasks, with subjective factors, 
such as the stability and permanency of the relationship, would be a 
feasible way to define “family” that would presumptively include adult 
adoptees. 
B.  Designation of an Heir for Partners 
As an alternative to adult adoption entirely, Professor Calvin 
Massey expands on an idea that has existed since Roman times: He 
proposes that states should “enable people to designate their heirs, to 
the partial or total exclusion of those persons who would otherwise be 
the actor’s heirs absent the designation.”203  Massey argues that 
designating an heir is a good solution to contesting the will, which is a 
common problem when the decedent’s estate plan is unpopular within 
the natural family.204  In fact, the ability to designate an heir already 
exists in Arkansas and Ohio.205 
 
202. Open Door Alcoholism Program, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 491 A.2d 17, 22 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).  
203. Massey, supra note 101, at 581. 
204. Id. at 583.  
205. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-8-102 (2004) (stating that “when any person desires to make 
a person an heir at law, it shall be lawful to do so by a declaration in writing in favor of the 
person, to be acknowledged before any judge, justice of the peace, clerk of any court, or 
before any court of record in this state”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (LexisNexis 
2011).  Ohio also allows a person to designate an heir: 
 
 A person of sound mind and memory may appear before the probate judge of 
the person’s county and in the presence of such judge and two disinterested persons 
of that person’s acquaintance, file a written declaration declaring that, as the 
person’s free and voluntary act, the person did designate and appoint another, 
stating the name and place of residence of the other person specifically, to stand 
toward the person in the relation of an heir at law in the event of the person’s 
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Why would designating an heir be better than an adult adoption?  
When the motivation for the adoption is to codify some type of legal 
relationship between partners, adult adoption (which creates the status 
of parent–child) “provides neither an adequate definition for the 
relationship resulting from the adult adoption . . . nor an adequate 
resolution of the testamentary and dissolution problems inherent in 
same-sex cohabitation.”206  It will also be useful in states that prevent 
partner adoption for public policy reasons, such as New York.207  In New 
York, one partner cannot adopt another, but if one could designate the 
other as his or her heir, the underlying motivation for the adoption 
(presumably providing for the partner after death) would be fulfilled.  
Finally, another benefit of designating an heir instead of adopting an 
adult is that the designation of an heir is revocable.208 
Designating an heir between partners would be practical, but when 
the motivation for the adoption is to codify an existing parent–child 
relationship or to bring the adoptee within a class gift, adoption seems 
to be the better option based on existing case law.209  In Blackwell v. 
Bowman, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a designated heir could not 
inherit through his designator from the estate of the designator’s 
brother.210  Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that the 
children of the designated heir cannot inherit from the designator; the 
only relationship created by designating an heir is between the 
 
death. . . .  From then on the person designated will stand in the same relation, for 
all purposes, to the declarant as the person designated could if a child born in lawful 
wedlock.  The rules of inheritance will be the same between the person designated 
and the relations by blood of the declarant, as if so born. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15. 
206. Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family, Marriage, and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 681, 691 (1990). 
207. See In re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424, 425 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that 
adopting a partner is “wholly inconsistent with the underlying public policy of providing a 
parent–child relationship for the welfare of the child.”). 
208. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.15 (stating that after one year, the 
declarant may have such designation vacated). 
209. See Albert H. Leyerle, The Ohio Designated Heir Statute, 21 AKRON L. REV. 391, 
399–400 (1988) (explaining that there are significant grey areas with the statute and that as 
opposed to adoption, the designated heir cannot inherit “through” the designator). 
210. 80 N.E.2d 493, 494, 498 (Ohio 1948) (stating that “the rational interpretation of the 
language . . . is that when a declarant has designated an heir, that heir stands only as to 
declarant and not his family or relatives, in the same relation, for all purposes, as designee 
would if a child born in lawful wedlock; and that the rules of inheritance as to the property of 
declarant will be the same between him and the relatives by blood of declarant as if designee 
had been so born”). 
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designator and the designated heir.211  Thus, as it stands right now, 
designation of an heir would be a better option only for those who 
would be prohibited from adoption. 
With the solution, the statutory rules create inherent difficulties in 
determining the property rights of the designated heirs and natural 
family members.  For example, suppose the testator dies leaving a piece 
of real property to his children, then to their legal heirs.  One of the 
testator’s children did not have any natural children but had designated 
an heir under the statute.  Should the designated heir be allowed to take 
the property after the designator’s death?  What if the language in the 
will had stated that the property would benefit the “issue of my body”?  
Should the court follow the progression of adoption, where adoptees 
may still be included in a gift despite language that limits gifts to the 
“heirs of my body”?212  One can imagine a host of difficulties presented 
with designating an heir, such as how the designation affects the anti-
lapse statutes and disinherited heirs.  As a result of these difficulties, this 
solution works best with small and uncomplicated estates. 
C.  Uniform Law with Inclusive Policy Toward Adult Adoptees 
The majority of the time, the goal of the adoption is to take in the 
person as a genuine member of the family.  A default rule that 
uniformly recognizes the adoptee’s inheritance rights is generally in line 
with the adoptor’s motivation for the adoption.  The UPC is highly 
influential in creating uniformity and instituting reform.213  Today, the 
UPC suggests that if the transferor is not the adoptive parent, an 
adoptee will not take in a class gift unless: “(1) the adoption took place 
 
211. See Kirsheman v. Paulin, 98 N.E.2d 26, 32 (Ohio 1951) (stating that “a ‘designated 
heir’ reaches the status of a child only upon the death of his designator, and if such designated 
heir predeceases his designator the children of the former do not become heirs at law or next 
of kin of the designator so as to inherit from him”). 
212. See In re Trusts Created with Agreement by Harrington, 250 N.W.2d 163, 167 
(Minn. 1977) (holding that the adoptee was entitled to take from the trust established by her 
adoptive grandparent because of the presumption in favor of adoptees, even though the trust 
was for the benefit of the testator’s daughter and the “issue of her body”). 
213. Roger W. Andersen, The Influence of the Uniform Probate Code in Nonadopting 
States, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 599, 599–600 (1985) (stating that the UPC was adopted 
outright in fourteen states and highly influential in non-adopting states).  In 1985, Andersen 
found more than fifty cases from non-adopting states where the courts “suggest[ed] UPC 
sections that legislators ought to consider and demonstrate[d] how advocates might 
effectively use the Code.”  Id. at 609.  Advocates can use the UPC “as secondary authority in 
a manner similar to the restatements and as an aid to interpreting legislative history in 
jurisdictions that have considered specific UPC provisions.”  Id. 
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before the adoptee reached [18] years of age; (2) the adoptive parent 
was the adoptee’s stepparent or foster parent; or (3) the adoptive parent 
functioned as a parent of the adoptee before the adoptee reached [18] 
years of age.”214  Although the age of eighteen is in brackets, signaling 
that the UPC does not anticipate uniformity on this issue, the format of 
the rule is restrictive and only includes adult adoptees if they meet one 
of the exceptions.215  The UPC could create more uniformity and a more 
favorable policy toward adult adoptees.  First, it could have a general 
policy of inclusion (with exclusion as the exception), and second, it 
could eliminate or raise the age by which the adoption must occur.216 
The solution should be geared toward the status of adoptees within 
class gifts.  There seems to be uniformity where the decedent is the 
adoptee’s parent: the adoptee will be included within a class gift and the 
adoptee will be entitled to take intestate.217  The status of an adoptee 
only becomes complicated where the adoptee could potentially be 
included within a class gift from a transferor who is not also the adoptor.  
Uniformity and inclusivity for adoptees in class gifts are beneficial for at 
least three reasons: First, many scholars approve of adult adoption, even 
for collateral reasons, such as denying standing to natural heirs.218  
Second, the adoption statutes purport to provide a total transplantation 
from the old family to the new family, which should include adult 
adoptees.219  Third, some courts have recognized that it is the nature of 
the relationship between parties that is crucial, not the status of the 
blood relationship.220 
A law that would create uniformity for adult adoptees’ inheritance 
rights under class gifts is supported by scholarly approval of adult 
adoption.221  For instance, Justice Holmes wrote that adopting another 
adult for the purpose of denying standing to relatives was “perfectly 
proper.”222  Another example is In re Adoption of Swanson, where the 
 
214. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-705(f) (2004) (amended 2008). 
215. Id. 
216. See Andersen, supra note 213 (explaining the great influence the UPC has over 
state probate laws). 
217. Rein, supra note 1, at 733. 
218. See infra text accompanying notes 222–225. 
219. Rein, supra note 1, at 719. 
220. See Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 888, 
890 (Minn. 1960). 
221. See infra text accompanying notes 222–225. 
222. Collamore v. Learned, 50 N.E. 518, 518–19 (Mass. 1898). 
18 - MESSLER-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2012  9:58 PM 
2012] INCONSISTENT INHERITANCE RIGHTS 1079 
adoptor sought “to prevent collateral claims . . . from remote family 
members.”223  The court stated that beyond the “common sense 
limitations,” the motive behind an adult adoption is generally not 
relevant.224  If scholars are willing to support adult adoptions, even for 
motivations that would disrupt the testator’s testamentary disposition, it 
seems that, overall, there should be a more inclusive policy toward adult 
adoptees.  One would have to think that the vast majority of adult 
adoptions occur for pure reasons, such as out of love and affection, 
rather than to upset a testamentary disposition, especially considering 
the permanence of adult adoptions once they are affected.225 
In addition to general approval of adult adoption, a more inclusive 
policy toward adult adoptees is supported by the general policy of 
adoption statutes—total transplantation.226  When the first adoption 
statutes were passed, adoptees were treated differently than blood 
relatives and were barred from inheriting from third-party donors under 
the “stranger-to-the-adoption rule.”227  In contrast, statutes today treat 
adopted children as “full-fledged” members of the adoptive family.228  
Today, the overarching goal of adoption statutes is to promote the best 
interests of the adoptee, a goal accomplished by totally transplanting the 
adoptee into the new family.229  With the same “common sense 
limitations,” this general policy of inclusion should be extended to adult 
adoptees.230  Considering that the adoptee loses all rights to inherit from 
their natural family, there is a deterrent to adopting for deceitful 
reasons.231 
In addition to scholarly support and the goal of total transplantation 
of adoption statutes, there is a public policy reason to create an inclusive 
 
223. 623 A.2d 1095, 1096 (Del. 1993). 
224. Id. at 1097, 1099. 
225. Snodgrass, supra note 46, at 75 (reporting that adoption is permanent); see also 
Smith v. Reinhart (In re Will of Adler), 30 Wis. 2d 250, 262, 140 N.W.2d 219, 226 (Wis. 1966) 
(stating that “[a]doptions are almost without exception made for the purpose of making the 
adopted child an integral part of the family circle for all purposes”). 
226. Rein, supra note 1, at 719. 
227. Id. at 771 (quoting Cahn, supra note 5, at 1128). 
228. Id. at 772. 
229. See Kelly v. Iverson (In re Estates of Donnelly), 502 P.2d 1163, 1166–67 (Wash. 
1972); Rein, supra note 1, at 713, 719. 
230. In re Adoption of Swanson, 623 A.2d 1095, 1099 (Del. 1993). 
231. See WIS. STAT. § 854.20(1) (2009–2010) (“[A] legally adopted person ceases to be 
treated as a child of the person’s birth parents” except where the person is adopted by a step-
parent, in which case the adoptee is still treated as the child of the natural parent who married 
the step-parent.). 
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presumption toward adult adoptees: a “family” can be created just as 
much through adoption as it can through blood relationships. The 
Minnesota courts, in accordance with the statutes, have treated adoptees 
the same as natural children as long as there is not explicit language to 
the contrary in the testamentary disposition: “The family relationship is 
created far more by love, understanding, and mutual recognition of 
reciprocal duties and bonds, than by physical genesis.”232  If the adoptor 
and adoptee choose to undergo the irreversible process of legally 
codifying a parent–child relationship, they should be entitled to the 
benefits stemming from any natural family relationship, including rights 
to inheritance.  Thus, the uniform policy should presumptively include 
adult adoptees within a testamentary disposition, with limitations upon 
such right as the exception. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As summarized by the comparison of laws in Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Indiana, and Minnesota, the inheritance rights of adult adoptees vary 
across jurisdictions.  The adult adoptee’s inheritance rights depend on 
the status of the stranger-to-the-adoption rule in the jurisdiction, the age 
limitations for inheritance in the jurisdiction, and whether there is any 
language granting or restricting inheritance rights in the testamentary 
documents.  Some states, such as Minnesota, have a very favorable 
policy toward adult adoptees and only restrict inheritance rights if the 
testamentary document explicitly prohibits adult adoptees from 
taking.233  In contrast, Wisconsin restricts the right of adult adoptees to 
inherit from third parties, only allowing adoptees to inherit if they were 
adopted before the age of eighteen or if they were raised in the 
adoptor’s household before the age of fifteen.234  The majority of the 
time, the goal of the adoption is to make the adoptee a genuine member 
of the family.  As it stands, states do not uniformly treat adult adoptees 
as genuine members of the family.  A default rule that uniformly 
recognizes the adoptee’s inheritance rights is generally in line with the 
adoptor’s motivation for the adoption.  Three proposals may help to 
remedy this inconsistency: First, “family” should be defined by looking 
at the functional role each member plays, as opposed to using marital 
 
232. Patrick v. N. City Nat’l Bank of Duluth (In re Will of Patrick), 106 N.W.2d 888, 890 
(Minn. 1960). 
233. See supra text accompanying note 184. 
234. WIS. STAT. § 854.20 (2009–2010). 
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status to define “family” and to determine the benefits that accompany 
that status.235  Second, allowing a person to designate his or her heir is a 
partial solution for partners that are prevented from adopting or for 
partners who are discouraged from adopting by the awkward parent–
child relationship that would result from the adoption.236  Third, a 
uniform law that gives an adult adoptee the status of a natural child of 
the adoptor, without any age limits, would ensure the equal treatment of 
adult adoptees across the country.237 
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